Skip to content

Author: John Ascher

August 3, 2026: Launch of Competere Foundation India Report Gains Wide Coverage in Media

August 3- Competere Foundation presented a groundbreaking new study “India’s Next Growth Frontier” to an event organized by the Centre for Trade and Investment Law (CTIL) of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) along with the Competere Foundation in New Delhi on July 29.The event was entitled “India’s Reform Trajectory, Market Distortions and the Next Frontier for Growth and Competitiveness” and was keynoted by State Election Commissioner of the Union Territory of Ladakh and Former Secretary, Government of India, Shri Sudhanshu Pandey.

Shanker Singham, President of the Competere Foundation presented the report to the event (see picture below). 

Let to Right: Shanker Singham, Chairman, Competere Foundation; Parthsarathi Jha, Partner, Economic Laws Practice; Danish Hashim, Head - Ease of Doing Business & MNCs, Confederation of Indian Industry; Sudhanshu Pandey, State Election Commissioner of UT Ladakh and Former Secretary, Government of India; and James Nedumpara, Professor and Head, CTIL

The event coverage highlighted the excitement generated by the report’s findings that India has improved its score in the Market Distortions Performance Index (MDPI) between 2010 and 2023, going from 82nd to 57th place. The MDPI is expected to be formally launched in the first quarter of 2027.

Other coverage also referenced the continuing effort need by India to improve its competitiveness. The Financial Express reported: “….The report said that the next phase of economic growth will depend on addressing the distortions that continue to restrict competition and investment. For instance, sectoral foreign direct investment (FDI) caps, government approval routes, and restrictions on business models in sectors such as retail, e-commerce, media, defence, banking and aviation continue to pose as barriers that reduce market contestability and investment.”

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, through the Indian Press Information Bureau,  issued an extensive report on the event and posted the new report as well. The coverage extended to dozens of financial and other news sites, and into social media like Instagram.

June 23, 2026: Singham Addresses OECD Roundtable on National Security Considerations in Competition Enforcement

On June 23, 2026 Shanker Singham was one of the featured panelists at a OECD Roundtable, entitled “National Security Considerations in Competition Enforcement: Best Practice Roundtables on Competition.”

Here is how the OECD described the issue on their site for the event: 

“National security considerations are becoming increasingly prominent in economic policymaking, extending beyond defence to include economic security, supply chain resilience, technological capability and strategic autonomy. As these concerns affect a growing range of sectors, they are also intersecting more frequently with competition enforcement.

Because some national security concerns may have implications for market structure, competitive dynamics or remedies, competition authorities may need to assess them within the limits of their mandate. At the same time, not all security-related considerations can be addressed through competition law. Where such concerns fall outside established competition analysis, they may require assessment by governments or specialised bodies. It is therefore crucial to preserve analytical discipline, legal certainty and predictable enforcement, while ensuring appropriate co-ordination with broader public policy objectives.”

Below is a link to the takeaway document provided by Shanker Singham to the OECD.

June 12, 2026: The Local Cost of Global Protectionism: How South Korea’s Digital Trade Regulations will drain billions from every state in America

By Shanker Singham

When Americans think of trade wars, they usually envision shipping containers sitting idle in ports, steep tariffs dominating the news cycle, and diplomatic standoffs over agricultural quotas. But the architecture of global protectionism has profoundly evolved. Today, the most damaging barriers to American prosperity are rarely erected at customs checkpoints. Instead, they are quietly engineered within foreign regulatory agencies, cloaked in the bureaucratic and seemingly benign language of “fairness,” “market balance,” and “precautionary antitrust.”

Right now, one of America’s closest geopolitical and economic allies, the Republic of Korea, is offering a masterclass in this new breed of behind-the-border protectionism, and its poised to become a cause a state-level economic crisis in the U.S.

The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), under the leadership of Chairman Ju Biung-ghi, is aggressively advancing a legislative framework broadly known as the “Online Platform Fairness Act.” Ostensibly modeled on Europe’s rigid ex-ante digital regulations, the legislation abandons decades of traditional, effects-based antitrust enforcement. Instead, it seeks to proactively hobble the digital ecosystems that define the modern global economy.

In other words, Korea is already an increasingly unfriendly place for U.S. companies to do business – especially tech companies like Google, Meta, Netflix, Coupang and others. Korea’s looming regulations will make that environment even worse. Our latest economic modeling at the Competere Foundation demonstrates it will cost Main Street America roughly half a trillion in losses over the next decade. That equates to billions in losses across all 50 states. For states that have a larger tech sector presence, like Washington, California, Texas and New York, the impact will be even more acute.

For policymakers in Washington D.C., and particularly for state governors and local representatives across the country, this might initially look like a niche dispute over foreign competition theory. It is not. As our latest research shows, Korea’s regulatory drift is an Anti-Competitive Market Distortion (ACMD) of historic proportions. It is a targeted, asymmetrical assault on U.S. technology leadership.

Crucially, this macroeconomic damage will not be absorbed evenly. The burden of Korea’s digital protectionism will fall heavily and disproportionately on specific U.S. states. It will hollow out local economies, suppress regional job growth, and act as an invisible, regressive tax on ordinary American families. It is time for state and federal lawmakers alike to recognize foreign technology regulation for what it has become: a localized economic crisis that demands immediate action.

The Hypocrisy of “Precautionary Antitrust”

To understand the severity of this threat, we first must recognize the underlying mechanics and glaring hypocrisy of the KFTC’s approach. The proposed legislation has been strictly and intentionally scoped to target the online platform sector. Unsurprisingly, this is a space overwhelmingly pioneered, developed, and dominated by U.S. innovators such as Google, Apple, Meta, and Uber.

Under the guise of the Fairness Act, the KFTC is seeking to subject these American tech companies to draconian oversight and the constant threat of structurally disruptive fines. The rationale? Engaging in business practices that are universally accepted as pro-competitive and efficiency-enhancing everywhere else in the world.

Yet, while Seoul hyper-focuses its regulatory apparatus on foreign digital platforms, it turns a remarkably blind eye to the deeply entrenched monopolies operating within its own borders. Over the past several years, the KFTC has actively fostered market concentration for its domestic chaebols (large industrial conglomerates). The agency cleared mega-mergers that created near-monopolies in the aviation sector (Korean Air-Asiana) and the automotive space (Hyundai-Kia). Simultaneously, it permits a handful of domestic conglomerates to passively control nearly 90 percent of the Korean retail and telecommunications sectors. Furthermore, Chinese technology competitors—often heavily subsidized and shielded by the Chinese Communist Party—are largely given a free pass to operate without the same scrutiny.

This is not a neutral application of the law designed to maximize consumer welfare. It is industrial policy disguised as antitrust enforcement. By leveraging domestic regulations specifically to handicap foreign entrants and artificially construct barriers to entry, Seoul is borrowing directly from the mercantilist playbook typically associated with the Chinese economic model.

It has not gone unnoticed by US policymakers that Chinese tech firms have been spared this, even as the government grows ever close to Chairman Xi’s Chinese Communist Party.

From Abstract Distortions to Concrete State Losses

For decades, apologists for foreign protectionism have argued that non-tariff barriers, domestic regulations, and antitrust enforcement actions are simply too abstract to be quantified in hard-nosed trade negotiations. Under this theory, foreign regulations are a matter of internal “domestic sovereignty” and should be left off the table during serious bilateral talks.

Our data entirely dismantles this argument. Economic distortions are highly quantifiable, and their ripple effects are devastatingly real.

At the Competere Foundation, we utilize our proprietary ACMD productivity model to measure the precise drag these policies create on economic output. A functioning market relies on three core pillars: strong Property Rights, robust Domestic Competition, and open International Competition. Korea’s proposed legislation severely degrades all three. When we analyzed the “vicious circle” of Korea’s interventionist antitrust enforcement combined with its proposed ex-ante platform regulations, we calculated a staggering cost: a $525 billion drag on the U.S. economy over a ten-year period.

But an aggregate national figure of $525 billion, while massive, can be difficult to conceptualize. For a local mayor, a state senator, or a regional business leader, national GDP figures often feel disconnected from the day-to-day realities of their constituents. To truly understand the threat of these foreign regulations, we must look at how this economic loss is transmitted across the American landscape.

The U.S. economy is highly integrated. When a foreign government adopts rules that weaken voluntary exchange, reduce market access, or impose discriminatory compliance costs on U.S. firms, the harm does not magically stop at the corporate headquarters in Silicon Valley. It cascades through the economy via lost productivity, reduced capital investment, fractured digital supply chains, and lower long-run income growth.

The State Tech Exposure Coefficient: Mapping the Invisible Tax

To measure this localized impact, the Competere Foundation developed an addendum to our primary research, creating a framework to allocate the national economic loss directly across state economies. We went a step further by introducing the State Tech Exposure Coefficient (STEC).

The STEC acts as a critical multiplier. It scales the baseline GDP per capita loss up or down based on how heavily a given state’s economy relies on the digital and technology sector relative to the national average. Because the U.S. national average for the technology sector’s share of the economy is approximately 9.3 percent, states with a technology footprint larger than 9.3 percent experience a mathematically enhanced economic drag.

When we apply the STEC to the $525 billion national loss, the localized devastation becomes impossible to ignore. Korea’s digital policies are effectively levying a massive, invisible tariff on America’s most dynamic regional economies:

  • Washington State: Washington boasts a technology footprint that comprises roughly 21.5 percent of its gross state product, yielding a high STEC multiplier of 2.31. Because of its intense reliance on cloud computing, software development, and global e-commerce, Washington will absorb a deeply disproportionate hit. The state faces a projected $27.4 billion economic drag. On a human level, this equates to a staggering wealth extraction of more than $3,500 for every single resident in the state over the next decade.
  • California: As the undisputed epicenter of American digital innovation, California’s economy faces an outsized and existential threat. Over the next ten years, the state stands to lose over $123 billion in gross state product. This is not merely a loss of corporate valuation; this is capital that would otherwise fund local startups, generate high-paying engineering jobs, and support the broader service economy in regions stretching from the Bay Area to Silicon Beach.
  • Texas: Texas has aggressively and successfully positioned itself as a business-friendly haven for tech expansion, drawing massive investments, corporate relocations, and talent to cities like Austin and Dallas. But this rapid growth makes the state uniquely vulnerable to foreign digital protectionism. Texas faces a projected artificial wealth drain of $48.7 billion over the next ten years.
  • New York and Beyond: Traditional economic powerhouses are firmly in the crosshairs. Driven by the intersection of finance, media, and digital platforms, New York projects a massive economic extraction of $33.9 billion. Virginia, heavily reliant on tech infrastructure and data centers, faces an $18.2 billion loss. Even states like Massachusetts ($16.2 billion), Florida ($24 billion), and Illinois ($17.3 billion) will suffer massive, multi-billion dollar hits to their market potential.

The map below illustrates the different states and costs associated with the Korean policy for those states.

Why should a state governor or a local representative care about the bureaucratic rulings of the KFTC in Seoul? Because these numbers represent real, local economic destruction. When foreign regulators artificially cap the operational efficiency of U.S. digital platforms, they are capping the growth of the local software developers who build apps for those platforms, the local content creators who monetize through them, and the local pension funds invested in their continued success.

Shattering the “Pro-Poor” Myth

Faced with mounting pushback from international stakeholders, Chairman Ju and other defenders of the Fairness Act have attempted to seize the moral high ground. They have publicly claimed that these rigid, ex-ante frameworks are inherently “pro-poor,” arguing that reining in massive digital platforms protects smaller market participants from exploitation. By framing the issue this way, they subtly suggest that Washington should stand down and respect Seoul’s effort to balance the scales of social equity.

This narrative is an astonishing act of economic self-harm and betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of how wealth creation—and wealth destruction—actually operates.

When regulators fragment efficient digital ecosystems, chill innovation, and forcefully drive up operational compliance costs, the primary victims are rarely the executives of massive tech corporations. The resulting economic drag falls disproportionately on the poorest members of society and the smallest, most vulnerable economic actors.

Who actually relies on the seamless, integrated efficiency of these digital platforms? It is the small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) who utilize targeted digital ad networks to reach global customers on a shoestring marketing budget. It is the third-party sellers and mom-and-pop retailers on e-commerce platforms whose entire livelihoods depend on the world-class logistics and visibility those platforms provide. It is the gig workers—drivers, delivery personnel, and independent freelancers—who rely on highly optimized platform algorithms to connect them with consistent, reliable consumer demand.

When the KFTC forces a U.S. platform to alter its fundamental business model or silo its services, those massive compliance costs do not evaporate. They are instantly passed down the chain. Ad rates rise. Delivery fees increase. Market access for independent sellers shrinks. The ecosystem becomes more expensive and less efficient for everyone.

If a flawed foreign policy effectively extracts upwards of $3,500 from the local economy per person, it might be viewed as a mere inconvenience for the wealthy. But for working-class families and small business owners—whether they live in Seoul, Seattle, or San Antonio—it is a localized economic catastrophe.

A Mandate for State and Federal Action

The era of treating foreign antitrust enforcement as a purely sovereign, internal domestic matter must come to an end. When an allied nation weaponizes its regulatory agencies to systematically extract hundreds of billions of dollars from its trading partners, it is engaging in a modern trade war.

Our data provides a clear, highly quantifiable map of the damage. The $525 billion drain is not an abstract economic theory to be debated in academic journals; it is a calculated subtraction from the economic futures of communities across all fifty states.

U.S. policymakers including state level officials can no longer afford to view digital trade barriers as secondary diplomatic issues. The U.S. government—specifically the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of Commerce, and Congress—must aggressively confront Korea’s digital and antitrust drift.

Furthermore, state-level leaders must awaken to the reality that their local tax bases and job markets are under direct threat from foreign regulatory capture. Governors, state legislators, and local chambers of commerce should be actively pressuring their federal representatives to elevate this issue to the highest levels of bilateral dialogue.

To restore trust and foster mutual economic growth, South Korea must abandon this “big is bad” legislative drift. It must return to an evidence-based, consumer-welfare standard that protects the competitive process itself, rather than utilizing regulatory gerrymandering to shield domestic conglomerates from international rivalry.

Until Seoul reverses course, Washington and state capitols across the country must treat the Online Platform Fairness Act and Korea’s approach to competition policy in the digital space exactly for what it is: a direct, highly quantifiable, half-trillion-dollar assault on the American economy, paid for by the workers, small businesses, and innovators of the fifty states.

May 6, 2026: What Viktor Orbán’s demise tells us about the new political compass

Shanker Singham and Jim Carter have co-authored a  piece on the recent historic defeat of Victor Orban in Hungary, and the need to now redefine the current view of the “political spectrum”.

As the piece states in the sub-head: “While most political discussions focus on left vs. right, the north-south axis reveals key insights into leaders and political regimes.”

Read the entire article in Blaze Media by clicking below.

April 20,2026:Competere’s CEO Shanker Singham tells USTR Overcapacity Stems from Foreign Anti-Competitive Market Distortions

WASHINGTON, April 20, 2026 —A submission to the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) said the structural excess capacity under investigation in a Section 301 probe is driven by foreign government policies that distort competition and disadvantage U.S. firms.

The filing, submitted by Shanker Singham on behalf of Competere LLC in response to USTR’s March 2026 initiation of investigations into global overcapacity, argues that the problem stems from what it calls Anti-Competitive Market Distortions (ACMDs). These include regulatory and institutional measures that damage US exporters, shield domestic firms, restrict foreign competition and lower US export volumes while artificially increasing imports into the US.

The document cites structural excess capacity as “not a naturally occurring market phenomenon” but “the direct, measurable output of specific choices governments make.”

It said many economies maintain the appearance of open markets while using regulatory barriers, investment restrictions and selective enforcement of competition laws to limit effective competition by foreign firms.

This creates “market access without market contestability,” where firms can enter a market but cannot compete on equal terms.

The filing argues that these distortions suppress U.S. exports, increase imports into the United States and contribute to wider trade imbalances.

It added that between 70% and 80% of trade-related economic harm now comes from domestic regulatory and institutional distortions rather than tariffs.

The submission by Competere is unique in that it provides a means to quantify the impact of these distortions in terms of their impact on GDP per capita. Furthermore, the document states: “By identifying the ACMD operating within the subject economy and applying a tariff calibrated to the scale of that distortion, the United States can correct the institutional failure that generates excess capacity without creating additional wealth destructive distortions in the global system.”

The submission cites South Korea, India and the European Union as key examples.

In South Korea, digital regulation and competition policy could impose costs of up to $525 billion on the U.S. economy over ten years, the filing said. In India, foreign investment restrictions and competition policy could create $156 billion in U.S. economic drag over five years. It also warned that European Union regulatory alignment with the United Kingdom could reduce U.S. export opportunities, and impose $23 – 73bn dollars of damage to the US economy, risking 350,000 jobs. In the case of South Korea, the filing suggests that the net effect of Korean policies is to boost Chinese platforms at the expense of their US competitors.

The filing urged USTR to use Section 301 to address these distortions directly by treating them as unreasonable barriers to U.S. commerce and applying targeted tariffs calibrated to their impact.

The submission frames the issue as both an economic and strategic concern, arguing that such distortions weaken U.S. firms globally while strengthening state-supported competitors.

The USTR investigations are ongoing, and hearings with oral testimony are scheduled in May.

END