When President Trump and President Xi Jinping concluded their May 14-15 summit in Beijing, the headline outcomes were familiar: discussion of a new U.S.-China “Board of Trade,” expectations of major new Chinese purchases of American agricultural products and indications that some tariffs on non-sensitive goods could eventually be reduced. Markets welcomed the renewed dialogue and continuation of the tariff truce. But the summit produced no meaningful commitments on industrial subsidies, state-directed overcapacity or the broader distortions embedded in China’s economic system.
That matters because managed trade can buy time, but it cannot fix the source of conflict.
For decades, the standard playbook for international development relied heavily on foreign assistance. But as global economic paradigms shift, we are seeing a growing consensus around a more sustainable model: Trade Over Aid. This approach emphasizes integrating developing nations into the global market rather than making them dependent on external financial support. Some 35 nations have now come out in support of US proposals in this area.
Nations’ Representatives at the Trade Over Aid Launch Event – April 27, 2026 at the New York Stock Exchange (US Mission to the United Nations)
But why is this shift so critical right now? To truly understand the power of prioritizing trade over traditional foreign assistance, we have to look at it through the lens of ACMD (Anti-Competitive Market Distortions) theory. When we do, it becomes clear that “Trade Over Aid” isn’t just a catchy policy slogan—it is a structural necessity for real economic growth.
What is ACMD Theory?
At its core, ACMD theory posits that the greatest threats to economic growth aren’t visible barriers like tariffs. Instead, the real damage comes from Anti-Competitive Market Distortions (ACMDs)—a network of “behind-the-border” policies that inhibit voluntary exchange, favor entrenched incumbents, and stifle new entrants.
Think of trade barriers as an iceberg. Traditional trade policy only looks at the tip of the iceberg: tariffs and quotas. ACMD theory exposes the massive, submerged chunk of ice hiding below the water line. These are the insidious roadblocks:
Burdensome, opaque domestic regulations
Unfair advantages for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
Weak protection of property rights and intellectual property
Subsidies that artificially prop up inefficient industries
These distortions act as a massive drag on an economy, absorbing energy, destroying value, and suppressing innovation.
The Fundamental Flaw of “Aid First”
When we pump traditional foreign aid into an economy plagued by high ACMDs, we are effectively pouring water into a leaky bucket.
Worse, aid can sometimes calcify these distortions. Capital influxes without structural reform often end up captured by the very incumbents who benefit from a distorted market. It removes the urgency for governments to fix weak property rights or dismantle cronyism because the financial shortfalls are being subsidized by foreign taxpayers. Aid doesn’t melt the iceberg; it just helps the ship survive the crash a little longer.
Why “Trade Over Aid” is the ACMD Antidote
This is exactly why US proposals favoring Trade Over Aid align perfectly with ACMD theory:
It Incentivizes Structural Reform You can’t mandate a country to fix its internal market distortions through a charity check. However, access to the massive United States consumer market is the ultimate carrot. By structuring trade agreements that require reciprocal commitments to reduce ACMDs (like strengthening IP laws or creating a level playing field for SMEs), Trade Over Aid uses market access to drive genuine, wealth-creating reforms.
It Empowers the Right Players Trade inherently rewards efficiency, innovation, and voluntary exchange. When an economy shifts its focus to global trade, the domestic pressure to dismantle regulatory roadblocks increases. Local entrepreneurs and small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) finally get the oxygen they need to compete on their own merits, rather than being squeezed out by state-backed monopolies.
It Creates a Reciprocal “Win-Win” Unlike aid, which is a one-way transfer of wealth, reducing ACMDs through trade agreements generates mutual economic growth. When a partner nation clears out its anti-competitive distortions, its GDP per capita rises, creating a wealthier consumer base for US exports. Simultaneously, a fairer, less distorted global market reduces friction for US businesses operating abroad.
The Bottom Line
The persistence of poverty and sluggish growth in developing markets is rarely a symptom of a lack of capital; it is almost always a symptom of a distorted market.
ACMD theory shows us that true prosperity is only unlocked when willing buyers and willing sellers can exchange freely. By championing Trade Over Aid, the US is shifting the global focus away from treating the symptoms of poverty and moving toward curing the disease of market distortion. Ultimately, an open, competitive market is the greatest engine for human prosperity ever discovered—and trade is the key that starts the ignition.
During the April 16, 2026 US House Appropriations Committee Hearing on the USTR budget, Congressman Ben Cline of Virginia’s Sixth District questioned Ambassador Greer concerning the discrimination against US tech companies by the KFTC. At one point, Cline asked Greer to “lean hard on them.”
Cline cited the recent study by the Competere Foundation showing the damage to the US GDP per capita by the Korean agency’s targeting of US firms.
Here is the transcript of the interchange:
Cline: The 2026 National Trade Estimate report identified Korea’s digital trade policies, including KFTC’s enforcement campaign and the Fairness Act, as significant barriers to U.S. companies. Research by the Competere Foundation estimates that Korea’s policies could cost the U.S. economy 525 billion over the next decade, with American households losing nearly $4,000 each. What specific enforcement mechanisms is USTR using to hold Korea to its commitments under the Joint Fact Sheet? And as you know, the Korean government continues its transparent discrimination against U.S. digital companies. At what point does continued Korean defiance trigger formal trade actions?
Greer: As you know, we have a Joint Fact Sheet with Korea where they specifically agreed and committed not to use these types of laws or rules on a discriminatory basis. And so this is something where we’re holding their feet to the fire. You know, we have tools, Section 301 is a tool that I’ve talked about today, and some of you have discussed. This is something we can use if we need to. Again, I’ve had conversations with my counterpart in Korea. I’ve spoken with the Prime Minister of Korea about this issue. I know there are a lot of views domestically about big tech companies and regulation and that kind of thing. What I want is a situation where Congress gets to decide how American tech companies are controlled and not foreign jurisdictions, so we are very attentive to any suggestion of discrimination by foreign countries against our companies.
Cline: We need to be leaning on them pretty hard. Their proposed fairness access sets market thresholds that Chinese platforms like Tiktok, Temu, and Alibaba fall below, effectively exempting them from the regulations entirely, while American companies are bearing the full weight of the fines and operational mandates. To put it in perspective, just a quick glimpse at the new 1260H list of Chinese military companies included some of these firms, like Alibaba. Does the administration view Korea’s discriminatory treatment as a national security concern? And if so, is that concern being incorporated into how you’re approaching enforcement?
Greer: So if they were to follow through with this and apply these laws in a discriminatory way, we would take action. Until now, they have been proposing to speak to us and negotiate with us, because we are concerned about this, and you know, we are prepared to take action if we need to, because it’s not like there’s some other company waiting to step into the wings, other than some of these Chinese companies you’re talking about.
On Thursday 9th April 2026, Growth Commission Chairman Shanker Singham joined Ian Collins on Talk to discuss the impact on the UK economy of the situation in Iran and for a wider discussion about how to foster economic growth.
Buckingham, UK — March 18th, 2026 — Shanker Singham, Chair of the Growth Commission and CEO of Competere, will speak at a major economic conference later this month examining how the United Kingdom can restore economic growth after years of stagnation.
Singham will appear at the conference “Mending Britain’s Broken Economy” on Monday 23 March 2026 at the Vinson Centre at the University of Buckingham. The one-day event is being co-hosted by the Growth Commission and the Institute of International Monetary Research and will bring together leading economists, policymakers and business leaders to debate solutions to Britain’s persistent growth challenge.
Singham will participate in the panel discussion “Supply Side Policy, Market Distortions and Regulatory Failure” from 12:10–13:10, alongside Greg Smith MP, Shadow Minister for Energy Security and Transport, and entrepreneur and investor Simon Dolan.
The panel will examine the role of regulatory policy, competition barriers and supply-side reform in determining the UK’s economic performance.
In his remarks, Singham is expected to address recent proposals for the United Kingdom to align its Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regulations with those of the European Union — an issue that has sparked growing debate about the future direction of UK trade and regulatory policy.
Recent analysis by Competere for the Growth Commission estimates that dynamic alignment with EU SPS rules could result in a £15 billion hit to the UK economy, while limiting Britain’s ability to pursue a more pro-competitive regulatory framework and negotiate trade agreements with key global partners.
Commenting on the issue recently, Singham said:
“Hardwiring EU SPS regulations into UK law would be a monumental act of self-harm that would be extremely difficult to reverse. With a pressing need to grow its economy, the last thing the UK should be doing is aligning with a regulatory system that has contributed to stagnant growth across much of Europe.
“So far the UK has avoided being subject to a Section 301 investigation initiated by the Trump Administration. The UK would be well advised to consider that moving forward with this realignment may cause the United States to rethink its position, as these new agricultural standards could undermine recently negotiated openings in the UK market for US food exports.”
Singham argues that the global trading system is increasingly characterised by two competing regulatory models. One is based on regulatory competition and mutual recognition, which allows countries to maintain different rules while recognising each other’s standards. The other requires harmonisation at the most restrictive level, a model commonly associated with the EU and China.
According to Singham, the UK’s economic success after Brexit will depend heavily on whether it embraces regulatory competition or moves back toward regulatory harmonisation.
“Having left the European Union, the UK has the opportunity to develop one of the most pro-competitive regulatory systems in the world,” Singham said. “Locking ourselves back into the EU’s regulatory framework would significantly restrict that opportunity as well as undermining the UK’s ability to pursue an ambitious global trade policy.”
Competere’s analysis of the impact of SPS alignment has generated significant national media attention in recent weeks, with coverage appearing in CapX, The Daily Telegraph, GB News, The Daily Express and The Sun, as well as discussion in the House of Lords.
The “Mending Britain’s Broken Economy” conference comes less than three weeks after the Chancellor’s Spring Statement and will provide an opportunity for leading economists to assess the state of the UK economy and debate policy reforms needed to restore growth.
The Growth Commission and its Chairman, Shanker Singham, have raised the temperature on the discussion on the discussion of the reportedly near-alignment of the United Kingdom with the European Union’s health and agricultural standards, known as SPS regulations.
Various newspapers and other media, including The Telegraph, and GB News have carried the Growth Commission’s warnings concerning a potential £15 Billion loss for the UK. Jacob Rees-Mogg of GB News interviewed Shanker Singham on the issue.
In addition, Lord Jackson of Peterborough and Baroness Lawlor cited Growth Commission calculations of the likely cost of the UK aligning with EU Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regulations during the House of Lords debates on the Government’s so-called EU ‘reset’ on 26th February. (See here.)
“When it comes to the global trading system, there is an ongoing battle between two competing models.
The first sees regulatory competition with equivalence and mutual recognition as far as regulations are concerned. That’s the classic system embodied by the likes of the United States, the World Trade Organisation and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
The second model is that favoured by China and the European Union, which demands harmonisation of regulations at the most restrictive level, making market access dependent on replicating regulations.
The United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU was in part a rejection of this latter model; and without question one of the greatest benefits of Brexit –albeit one still yet to be fully embraced and taken advantage of – is the ability to reject the one-size-fits-all approach to regulation taken by Brussels and instead calibrate our own home-grown rules for the maximum benefit of British consumers and businesses.
Regrettably, as part of its so-called ‘reset’ of relations with the EU, the current British Government is looking at going down the route of aligning its Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) regulations with those of the EU….”
By Shanker Singham, President, Competere Foundation
February 10, 2026
Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi led her ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partners to an unprecedented landslide victory in Japan’s House of Representatives, securing 352 of the House’s 465 seats on Sunday. Takaichi’s winning agenda of tax adjustments and supply side reform aimed at boosting consumption and business activity, spurring economic growth, and expanding investment in technology and strategic sectors had immediate impacts on Japanese markets, with the Nikkei 225 jumping nearly 4% to record highs and the FTSE All-World Index Japan rising over 8.7% compared to early January levels. However, this victory has even larger implications for the growth trajectory of the Japanese economy. Takaichi’s focus on technology and defense investment, together with her initiative to modify Japan’s constitution to strengthen its military capabilities amid rising regional tensions, sends a clear signal to American investors that Japan is positioning itself as the anchor for US capital in the Pacific. Japan’s growing policy alignment with the US on China only serves to reinforce that signal and attract further investment. Unfortunately, Japan’s closest mainland neighbor appears to be heading in the opposite direction.
At the worst possible moment, Korea is repeatedly sending adverse signals to American investors and damaging its own investment climate. In January 2026, two prominent US investment firms, Greenoaks Capital and Altimeter Capital, filed formal notices of intent to pursue arbitration claims against the South Korean government under the US–Korea Free Trade Agreement, alleging discriminatory treatment of the company Coupang Inc., and petitioned the US Trade Representative to investigate Seoul’s conduct under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The investors contend that Seoul’s response to a data breach and subsequent regulatory actions went beyond normal enforcement and had the effect of penalizing a US company in ways that disadvantage foreign competitors while benefiting domestic firms.
This lawsuit is a symptom of a broader and increasingly explicit investor reassessment of Korea as an investment destination. US and global investors are increasingly viewing Korea as a jurisdiction where long-term capital faces asymmetric regulatory exposure. Venture capital data already reflects this shift. While headline investment totals have been supported by a small number of large transactions, the number of VC deals in 2025 declined by more than 30 percent compared with the previous year, signaling a pullback in broad-based risk-taking. Additionally, South Korea tech startups raised just $181 million in Q1 2025, down 43 percent quarter on quarter and 67 percent year on year, underscoring a sharp contraction in new venture funding. Investors cited in recent market commentary warn that US investor sentiment toward Korea is weakening materially and they are less willing to fund new Korean ventures over ventures in countries with more favorable climates. Several US funds have gone further, describing Korea as increasingly uninvestable if current regulatory and enforcement trends persist.
Even more consequential for long-term capital allocation is Korea’s growing divergence from the US in its posture toward China, again a marked contrast from the direction of travel of Japan. Recent Korean policy choices and enforcement patterns increasingly mirror approaches that privilege domestic and China-linked competitors while imposing elevated compliance and political risk on US firms. For global investors, this is a direct input into capital allocation decisions. Capital that originates in the US is sensitive to jurisdictions perceived as drifting toward China-aligned regulatory norms, particularly in technology, data governance, and platform regulation. As Japan moves to reduce China exposure and deepen alignment with US economic and security priorities, Korea’s relative positioning is deteriorating. In a region where capital is explicitly reallocating away from China risk, Korea’s perceived trajectory places it on the wrong side of that shift.
The economic consequences of this deterioration in the investment environment are not speculative. Using its ACMD framework, the Competere Foundation is assessing whether the decline in investor protection, regulatory predictability, and the perception of investment difficulties will translate into lower GDP per capita for Korea. Preliminary results suggest as much as a $3,100 loss of GDP per capita or about $160bn total over a five-year time horizon, especially of the investment security pathway continues to decline. This is without considering the impact of potential capital movement away from Korea to Japan as investors abandon the deteriorating Korean investment climate for the strengthening Japanese one. The Competere Foundation is continuing to investigate the full extent of the economic consequences to the Korean economy and will publish its results shortly.
Korea only stands to lose, and quickly, if these trends continue. Capital is mobile and comparative, and investment decisions are quick to respond when a jurisdiction’s investment climate continuously demonstrates adverse signals. More concerning is the fact that lost investment flows are difficult to recover once alternative hubs establish momentum. Japan’s clear signaling as an attractive option for foreign capital already has global investors excited. If Korea continues its trend towards being a hostile investment climate, investors will not think twice about abandoning it for more promising prospects.
On December 16, 2025, Shanker Singham, the Chairman of the Competere Foundation, took center stage in a congressional hearing titled “Anti-American Antitrust: How Foreign Governments Target U.S. Businesses.” His critical testimony underscored the significant challenges foreign digital regulations pose to American tech firms, which he claims could damage not only U.S. economic growth but also national security itself.
Singham’s central argument was that aggressive antitrust regulations enacted by foreign governments—particularly those inspired by the European Union’s Digital Markets Act—are functioning as covert trade barriers. These prohibitive measures, he emphasized, disproportionately impact successful American technology companies, curbing their capacity for innovation while imposing substantial economic costs on the United States.
He illuminated the increasing global competition between the economic models of the U.S. and China, asserting that damaging U.S. tech firms inadvertently strengthens China’s market position. Through detailed research conducted by the Competere Foundation, Singham spotlighted South Korea as a particularly illustrative example of the ramifications of such foreign regulations.
According to Competere’s findings, Korea’s proposed rules on online platforms could result in significant financial losses, potentially costing the Korean economy up to $470 billion over the next decade. Moreover, they could also induce long-term losses exceeding $500 billion for the U.S. economy due to diminished exports and weakened incentives for innovation.
As a remedy to these concerns, Singham urged Congress to recognize discriminatory foreign antitrust and digital regulations as crucial issues pertaining to trade and economic security. He contended that American competition policies should foster consumer welfare and protect innovation rather than penalize market success based on nationality.
In closing, Singham urged U.S. federal agencies to assess and quantify the economic harm induced by these foreign regulatory obstacles. He stated, “Competition policy should protect innovation and open markets—not penalize success or target firms based on nationality.” This emphasis on balancing trade and regulatory frameworks echoes broader concerns within the U.S. about maintaining competitiveness in the global economy. Accompanying his oral testimony, Singham submitted an extensive written brief elaborating on these pressing issues, aiming to set a foundation for legislative changes that may better support American technology and innovation.
In today’s rapidly evolving digital landscape, Singham’s warnings resonate with the ongoing discussions among policymakers about the dire need for a deliberate approach toward foreign regulatory frameworks. As the competition between the U.S. and its global counterparts intensifies, safeguarding American innovation remains paramount, necessitating vigilant advocacy and strategic policy adjustments at all levels of government.
The Growth Commission’s calculation of the likely impact on economic growth of inserting unlimited compensation awards at employment tribunals into the Employment Rights Bill was cited in the House of Commons by Shadow Business and Trade Secretary Andrew Griffith on December 8, 2025.
The same day, the Daily mail cited Shanker Singham, the Growth Commission chair, in their coverage of the debate on recent changes in the bill.
“Last night the think-tank warned that removing the cap on unfair dismissal claims could add another £15billion to the cost. Chairman Shanker Singham said: ‘This single piece of legislation continues to severely curtail the Government’s growth ambitions. Ministers would do well to remember that what chills the ability to fire, chills the ability to hire as the UK labour force participation rate continues to drop.’ “
Singham further commented in a post on X: “The impact of the removal of the cap on employment tribunal awards more than takes away the benefit of removing certain day one rights. £13bn given with one hand and taken away with the other. This will certainly have growth damaging implications.”
You can watch Shadow Secretary Griffith’s remarks below.
Shanker Singham was amongst the panel of experts at the recent online panel discussion hosted by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation.
Singham, in his remarks (see video below), focused upon the recent work he has published concerning the impact of Korea’s Anti-Competitive Market Distortions (ADMDs) and their impact on US tech companies. Furthermore, he pointed to the EU’s digital platform regulations as the source of these anti-growth regulations in Korea.
Here is the overview of the entire panel discussion from ITIF’s YouTube description: “Governments around the world in recent years have deployed a wide range of policies that constitute non-tariff attacks (NTAs) on America’s leading technology companies. These attacks represent a new category of trade barriers that traditional frameworks fail to adequately address. Unlike conventional tariffs or standard non-tariff barriers (NTBs), NTAs may be disguised as conventional domestic regulations, but they are in fact designed to weaken specific U.S. firms and industries, extract resources from them, and assert strategic control over U.S. technological capabilities by restricting U.S. firms’ ability to innovate and compete on level terms. This undermines U.S. technology leadership at the expense of economic and national security in the geostrategic competition with China.
Watch now (click button below) for an expert panel discussion as we discuss a new ITIF report on policy solutions to non-tariff attacks (NTAs), and explore the stakes for U.S. innovation, technology leadership, and global competitiveness.
