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originally posts from competere

October 16, 2026: Pressure Against Dynamic Alignment Steps Up Before November 20 UK EU Summit; Lopez Warns that the US Could Cancel the Jaguar Land Rover Agreement

October 16, 2026- In the month leading up to the planned summit between UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham and EU officials Antonio Costa and Ursula von der Leyen, the following question is now arising. Are EU officials now weighing whether they can afford to make an agreement with the UK on dynamic alignment for the UK on SPS and CBAM regulations, given the fact that Conservative Party officials have made it clear that they will cancel those arrangements when they come back into power? 

An article in the Financial Times from October 6 entitled “Tory plan to rip up UK-EU food deal risks‘ huge uncertainty’ “quotes one EU diplomat that told the FT that the recent announced intent to cancel dynamic alignment “confirm to many people in Brussels and European capitals hat there is no point in entertaining thoughts of the UK rejoining the EU at this stage”. For the same reasons, even a partial reset could become unlikely.

Most prominently, Shadow Chancellor Andrew Griffith MP made unequivocal statements of the Conservative intent on these matters. Some of these statements, plus earlier statements by Shadow Secretary Alex Burghart can be seen here.

On October 8, Acting Shadow Secretary for Business and Trade Julia Lopez MP continued the public push by leading members of the Conservative Party against the proposed Labour reset with the EU. She sent a letter to Business Secretary Johnny Reynolds warning of the dire consequences of this proposed alignment, including warning of the following possible US response:

“The United States has already made its concern explicit. Its 2026 National Trade Estimate Report identifies prospective UK dynamic alignment as a trade concern and questions whether relevant restrictions are justified by risk and scientific evidence. In comments reported by the Financial Times this month, US Trade Representative, Jamieson Greer, also criticised Britain’s failure to use its post-Brexit freedom to improve access for American exporters. Ministers cannot credibly treat the American reaction as a purely hypothetical issue. The US President’s reaction to an agreement between Canada and the EU that does not change the legal status of either is an indication of how seriously the US will take the expansion of the EU’s SPS zone to include the UK. This is before taking into account the ratchet effect the EU is seeking to achieve through its Made in Europe rules.

The likely immediate response could be increased American pressure for concessions and resistance to further improvements in our trading arrangements. This at a time when the British automotive industry is extremely vulnerable to further tariffs being placed on UK car exports into the key US market. The Economic Prosperity Deal provides for a quota of 100,000 UK vehicles at a 10% US tariff. Its general terms expressly state that they are not legally binding. For a business such as Jaguar Land Rover, deterioration in that treatment could affect the economics of UK-built exports…..”

She awaits the response for the Secretary, but the response could come on November 20 in Brussels from the EU itself.

October 2, 2026: Growth Commission Event Previews Growth Budget 2026

Ahead of Chancellor John Healey’s first Budget later this month, The Growth Commission today publishes its 2026 Growth Budget with a warning that failure to heed its advice will cost the country dear.

The fourteen members of the independent and non-partisan Growth Commission have endorsed a suite of policies that would transform the UK from a country with stagnant growth that is sliding down the world economic league table into a growing economy that could overtake Japan and Germany to become the world’s fourth largest by the 2040s.

Measures in the package include:

  • Abolishing the pensions triple lock and making further savings across the welfare budget
  • Reining in public sector pay and pensions and reversing the increase in central government headcount
  • Abolishing or phasing out taxes that lose revenue in the long run such as Inheritance Tax, stamp duty on residential property and Corporation Tax on retained earnings
  • Wholesale reform of the planning system, including repeal of the Town and Country Planning Act
  • Repealing other economically harmful legislation such as the Employment Rights Act and Climate Change Act
  • Rejecting any elements of an EU ‘reset’ that would damage the UK’s ability to maintain both an independent trade policy and domestic regulatory autonomy

Growth Commission Chairman Shanker Singham said:

“Ever since its inception, The Growth Commission has set out for successive chancellors the policies needed for sustainable economic growth in the UK.

“We estimate that had our policies been implemented at each of the Budgets since 2023 rather than those that actually were introduced, UK GDP per capita in 2027 would be 7.2% higher – equivalent to an additional £3,185 at today’s incomes and prices for every woman, man and child in the country. If the Chancellor wants to inject this kind of income into the pockets of British people, and give them the hope that has been much discussed at the Labour Party conference, we are confident that he will look seriously at our recommendations.”

September 23, 2026: It’s time for Poland to join the G20

(Excerpt of article by Shanker Singham from CAPX)

We live in an age of rapid economic change. New technologies are having an impact on the world that was unthinkable a generation ago; and industries are more mobile than ever, meaning that supply chains get reshaped, new centres of growth emerge and we see the resulting shifts in the balance of economic power.

Yet far too many of the bodies and institutions supposedly setting the global economic agenda remain stuck in a bygone age, obstinately resistant to the changes occurring around them.

G20 membership is not about claiming economic perfection, but rather a recognition of countries making a substantial contribution to the global economy

The G20 is a case in point.

It is an entity that ought to be helping national leaders refocus on the core pillars that help deliver growth: economic dynamism, productivity and the elimination of barriers to voluntary exchange.

But the anti-growth policy choices of some existing members have a tendency to skew its conclusions because its membership still reflects the economic hierarchy of yesteryear.

That needs to change – and it is why The Growth Commission, which I chair, is calling for its membership to be reviewed and in particular for Poland to be afforded a permanent place at its table.

August 3, 2026: Launch of Competere Foundation India Report Gains Wide Coverage in Media

August 3- Competere Foundation presented a groundbreaking new study “India’s Next Growth Frontier” to an event organized by the Centre for Trade and Investment Law (CTIL) of the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) along with the Competere Foundation in New Delhi on July 29.The event was entitled “India’s Reform Trajectory, Market Distortions and the Next Frontier for Growth and Competitiveness” and was keynoted by State Election Commissioner of the Union Territory of Ladakh and Former Secretary, Government of India, Shri Sudhanshu Pandey.

Shanker Singham, President of the Competere Foundation presented the report to the event (see picture below). 

Let to Right: Shanker Singham, Chairman, Competere Foundation; Parthsarathi Jha, Partner, Economic Laws Practice; Danish Hashim, Head - Ease of Doing Business & MNCs, Confederation of Indian Industry; Sudhanshu Pandey, State Election Commissioner of UT Ladakh and Former Secretary, Government of India; and James Nedumpara, Professor and Head, CTIL

The event coverage highlighted the excitement generated by the report’s findings that India has improved its score in the Market Distortions Performance Index (MDPI) between 2010 and 2023, going from 82nd to 57th place. The MDPI is expected to be formally launched in the first quarter of 2027.

Other coverage also referenced the continuing effort need by India to improve its competitiveness. The Financial Express reported: “….The report said that the next phase of economic growth will depend on addressing the distortions that continue to restrict competition and investment. For instance, sectoral foreign direct investment (FDI) caps, government approval routes, and restrictions on business models in sectors such as retail, e-commerce, media, defence, banking and aviation continue to pose as barriers that reduce market contestability and investment.”

The Ministry of Commerce and Industry, through the Indian Press Information Bureau,  issued an extensive report on the event and posted the new report as well. The coverage extended to dozens of financial and other news sites, and into social media like Instagram.

June 23, 2026: Singham Addresses OECD Roundtable on National Security Considerations in Competition Enforcement

On June 23, 2026 Shanker Singham was one of the featured panelists at a OECD Roundtable, entitled “National Security Considerations in Competition Enforcement: Best Practice Roundtables on Competition.”

Here is how the OECD described the issue on their site for the event: 

“National security considerations are becoming increasingly prominent in economic policymaking, extending beyond defence to include economic security, supply chain resilience, technological capability and strategic autonomy. As these concerns affect a growing range of sectors, they are also intersecting more frequently with competition enforcement.

Because some national security concerns may have implications for market structure, competitive dynamics or remedies, competition authorities may need to assess them within the limits of their mandate. At the same time, not all security-related considerations can be addressed through competition law. Where such concerns fall outside established competition analysis, they may require assessment by governments or specialised bodies. It is therefore crucial to preserve analytical discipline, legal certainty and predictable enforcement, while ensuring appropriate co-ordination with broader public policy objectives.”

Below is a link to the takeaway document provided by Shanker Singham to the OECD.

June 12, 2026: The Local Cost of Global Protectionism: How South Korea’s Digital Trade Regulations will drain billions from every state in America

By Shanker Singham

When Americans think of trade wars, they usually envision shipping containers sitting idle in ports, steep tariffs dominating the news cycle, and diplomatic standoffs over agricultural quotas. But the architecture of global protectionism has profoundly evolved. Today, the most damaging barriers to American prosperity are rarely erected at customs checkpoints. Instead, they are quietly engineered within foreign regulatory agencies, cloaked in the bureaucratic and seemingly benign language of “fairness,” “market balance,” and “precautionary antitrust.”

Right now, one of America’s closest geopolitical and economic allies, the Republic of Korea, is offering a masterclass in this new breed of behind-the-border protectionism, and its poised to become a cause a state-level economic crisis in the U.S.

The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), under the leadership of Chairman Ju Biung-ghi, is aggressively advancing a legislative framework broadly known as the “Online Platform Fairness Act.” Ostensibly modeled on Europe’s rigid ex-ante digital regulations, the legislation abandons decades of traditional, effects-based antitrust enforcement. Instead, it seeks to proactively hobble the digital ecosystems that define the modern global economy.

In other words, Korea is already an increasingly unfriendly place for U.S. companies to do business – especially tech companies like Google, Meta, Netflix, Coupang and others. Korea’s looming regulations will make that environment even worse. Our latest economic modeling at the Competere Foundation demonstrates it will cost Main Street America roughly half a trillion in losses over the next decade. That equates to billions in losses across all 50 states. For states that have a larger tech sector presence, like Washington, California, Texas and New York, the impact will be even more acute.

For policymakers in Washington D.C., and particularly for state governors and local representatives across the country, this might initially look like a niche dispute over foreign competition theory. It is not. As our latest research shows, Korea’s regulatory drift is an Anti-Competitive Market Distortion (ACMD) of historic proportions. It is a targeted, asymmetrical assault on U.S. technology leadership.

Crucially, this macroeconomic damage will not be absorbed evenly. The burden of Korea’s digital protectionism will fall heavily and disproportionately on specific U.S. states. It will hollow out local economies, suppress regional job growth, and act as an invisible, regressive tax on ordinary American families. It is time for state and federal lawmakers alike to recognize foreign technology regulation for what it has become: a localized economic crisis that demands immediate action.

The Hypocrisy of “Precautionary Antitrust”

To understand the severity of this threat, we first must recognize the underlying mechanics and glaring hypocrisy of the KFTC’s approach. The proposed legislation has been strictly and intentionally scoped to target the online platform sector. Unsurprisingly, this is a space overwhelmingly pioneered, developed, and dominated by U.S. innovators such as Google, Apple, Meta, and Uber.

Under the guise of the Fairness Act, the KFTC is seeking to subject these American tech companies to draconian oversight and the constant threat of structurally disruptive fines. The rationale? Engaging in business practices that are universally accepted as pro-competitive and efficiency-enhancing everywhere else in the world.

Yet, while Seoul hyper-focuses its regulatory apparatus on foreign digital platforms, it turns a remarkably blind eye to the deeply entrenched monopolies operating within its own borders. Over the past several years, the KFTC has actively fostered market concentration for its domestic chaebols (large industrial conglomerates). The agency cleared mega-mergers that created near-monopolies in the aviation sector (Korean Air-Asiana) and the automotive space (Hyundai-Kia). Simultaneously, it permits a handful of domestic conglomerates to passively control nearly 90 percent of the Korean retail and telecommunications sectors. Furthermore, Chinese technology competitors—often heavily subsidized and shielded by the Chinese Communist Party—are largely given a free pass to operate without the same scrutiny.

This is not a neutral application of the law designed to maximize consumer welfare. It is industrial policy disguised as antitrust enforcement. By leveraging domestic regulations specifically to handicap foreign entrants and artificially construct barriers to entry, Seoul is borrowing directly from the mercantilist playbook typically associated with the Chinese economic model.

It has not gone unnoticed by US policymakers that Chinese tech firms have been spared this, even as the government grows ever close to Chairman Xi’s Chinese Communist Party.

From Abstract Distortions to Concrete State Losses

For decades, apologists for foreign protectionism have argued that non-tariff barriers, domestic regulations, and antitrust enforcement actions are simply too abstract to be quantified in hard-nosed trade negotiations. Under this theory, foreign regulations are a matter of internal “domestic sovereignty” and should be left off the table during serious bilateral talks.

Our data entirely dismantles this argument. Economic distortions are highly quantifiable, and their ripple effects are devastatingly real.

At the Competere Foundation, we utilize our proprietary ACMD productivity model to measure the precise drag these policies create on economic output. A functioning market relies on three core pillars: strong Property Rights, robust Domestic Competition, and open International Competition. Korea’s proposed legislation severely degrades all three. When we analyzed the “vicious circle” of Korea’s interventionist antitrust enforcement combined with its proposed ex-ante platform regulations, we calculated a staggering cost: a $525 billion drag on the U.S. economy over a ten-year period.

But an aggregate national figure of $525 billion, while massive, can be difficult to conceptualize. For a local mayor, a state senator, or a regional business leader, national GDP figures often feel disconnected from the day-to-day realities of their constituents. To truly understand the threat of these foreign regulations, we must look at how this economic loss is transmitted across the American landscape.

The U.S. economy is highly integrated. When a foreign government adopts rules that weaken voluntary exchange, reduce market access, or impose discriminatory compliance costs on U.S. firms, the harm does not magically stop at the corporate headquarters in Silicon Valley. It cascades through the economy via lost productivity, reduced capital investment, fractured digital supply chains, and lower long-run income growth.

The State Tech Exposure Coefficient: Mapping the Invisible Tax

To measure this localized impact, the Competere Foundation developed an addendum to our primary research, creating a framework to allocate the national economic loss directly across state economies. We went a step further by introducing the State Tech Exposure Coefficient (STEC).

The STEC acts as a critical multiplier. It scales the baseline GDP per capita loss up or down based on how heavily a given state’s economy relies on the digital and technology sector relative to the national average. Because the U.S. national average for the technology sector’s share of the economy is approximately 9.3 percent, states with a technology footprint larger than 9.3 percent experience a mathematically enhanced economic drag.

When we apply the STEC to the $525 billion national loss, the localized devastation becomes impossible to ignore. Korea’s digital policies are effectively levying a massive, invisible tariff on America’s most dynamic regional economies:

  • Washington State: Washington boasts a technology footprint that comprises roughly 21.5 percent of its gross state product, yielding a high STEC multiplier of 2.31. Because of its intense reliance on cloud computing, software development, and global e-commerce, Washington will absorb a deeply disproportionate hit. The state faces a projected $27.4 billion economic drag. On a human level, this equates to a staggering wealth extraction of more than $3,500 for every single resident in the state over the next decade.
  • California: As the undisputed epicenter of American digital innovation, California’s economy faces an outsized and existential threat. Over the next ten years, the state stands to lose over $123 billion in gross state product. This is not merely a loss of corporate valuation; this is capital that would otherwise fund local startups, generate high-paying engineering jobs, and support the broader service economy in regions stretching from the Bay Area to Silicon Beach.
  • Texas: Texas has aggressively and successfully positioned itself as a business-friendly haven for tech expansion, drawing massive investments, corporate relocations, and talent to cities like Austin and Dallas. But this rapid growth makes the state uniquely vulnerable to foreign digital protectionism. Texas faces a projected artificial wealth drain of $48.7 billion over the next ten years.
  • New York and Beyond: Traditional economic powerhouses are firmly in the crosshairs. Driven by the intersection of finance, media, and digital platforms, New York projects a massive economic extraction of $33.9 billion. Virginia, heavily reliant on tech infrastructure and data centers, faces an $18.2 billion loss. Even states like Massachusetts ($16.2 billion), Florida ($24 billion), and Illinois ($17.3 billion) will suffer massive, multi-billion dollar hits to their market potential.

The map below illustrates the different states and costs associated with the Korean policy for those states.

Why should a state governor or a local representative care about the bureaucratic rulings of the KFTC in Seoul? Because these numbers represent real, local economic destruction. When foreign regulators artificially cap the operational efficiency of U.S. digital platforms, they are capping the growth of the local software developers who build apps for those platforms, the local content creators who monetize through them, and the local pension funds invested in their continued success.

Shattering the “Pro-Poor” Myth

Faced with mounting pushback from international stakeholders, Chairman Ju and other defenders of the Fairness Act have attempted to seize the moral high ground. They have publicly claimed that these rigid, ex-ante frameworks are inherently “pro-poor,” arguing that reining in massive digital platforms protects smaller market participants from exploitation. By framing the issue this way, they subtly suggest that Washington should stand down and respect Seoul’s effort to balance the scales of social equity.

This narrative is an astonishing act of economic self-harm and betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of how wealth creation—and wealth destruction—actually operates.

When regulators fragment efficient digital ecosystems, chill innovation, and forcefully drive up operational compliance costs, the primary victims are rarely the executives of massive tech corporations. The resulting economic drag falls disproportionately on the poorest members of society and the smallest, most vulnerable economic actors.

Who actually relies on the seamless, integrated efficiency of these digital platforms? It is the small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) who utilize targeted digital ad networks to reach global customers on a shoestring marketing budget. It is the third-party sellers and mom-and-pop retailers on e-commerce platforms whose entire livelihoods depend on the world-class logistics and visibility those platforms provide. It is the gig workers—drivers, delivery personnel, and independent freelancers—who rely on highly optimized platform algorithms to connect them with consistent, reliable consumer demand.

When the KFTC forces a U.S. platform to alter its fundamental business model or silo its services, those massive compliance costs do not evaporate. They are instantly passed down the chain. Ad rates rise. Delivery fees increase. Market access for independent sellers shrinks. The ecosystem becomes more expensive and less efficient for everyone.

If a flawed foreign policy effectively extracts upwards of $3,500 from the local economy per person, it might be viewed as a mere inconvenience for the wealthy. But for working-class families and small business owners—whether they live in Seoul, Seattle, or San Antonio—it is a localized economic catastrophe.

A Mandate for State and Federal Action

The era of treating foreign antitrust enforcement as a purely sovereign, internal domestic matter must come to an end. When an allied nation weaponizes its regulatory agencies to systematically extract hundreds of billions of dollars from its trading partners, it is engaging in a modern trade war.

Our data provides a clear, highly quantifiable map of the damage. The $525 billion drain is not an abstract economic theory to be debated in academic journals; it is a calculated subtraction from the economic futures of communities across all fifty states.

U.S. policymakers including state level officials can no longer afford to view digital trade barriers as secondary diplomatic issues. The U.S. government—specifically the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), the Department of Commerce, and Congress—must aggressively confront Korea’s digital and antitrust drift.

Furthermore, state-level leaders must awaken to the reality that their local tax bases and job markets are under direct threat from foreign regulatory capture. Governors, state legislators, and local chambers of commerce should be actively pressuring their federal representatives to elevate this issue to the highest levels of bilateral dialogue.

To restore trust and foster mutual economic growth, South Korea must abandon this “big is bad” legislative drift. It must return to an evidence-based, consumer-welfare standard that protects the competitive process itself, rather than utilizing regulatory gerrymandering to shield domestic conglomerates from international rivalry.

Until Seoul reverses course, Washington and state capitols across the country must treat the Online Platform Fairness Act and Korea’s approach to competition policy in the digital space exactly for what it is: a direct, highly quantifiable, half-trillion-dollar assault on the American economy, paid for by the workers, small businesses, and innovators of the fifty states.

May 18, 2026: Improving the U.S.-China Trade Relationship

When President Trump and President Xi Jinping concluded their May 14-15 summit in Beijing, the headline outcomes were familiar: discussion of a new U.S.-China “Board of Trade,” expectations of major new Chinese purchases of American agricultural products and indications that some tariffs on non-sensitive goods could eventually be reduced. Markets welcomed the renewed dialogue and continuation of the tariff truce. But the summit produced no meaningful commitments on industrial subsidies, state-directed overcapacity or the broader distortions embedded in China’s economic system.

That matters because managed trade can buy time, but it cannot fix the source of conflict. 

(Read entire article by clicking below.)

May 6, 2026: Shanker Singham’s Prepared Remarks to 301 Investigation on Structural Excess Capacity

I. Opening

Chair, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. My name is Shanker Singham, and I am testifying on behalf of Competere LLC.

The central argument is this. Structural excess capacity is not a naturally occurring market phenomenon. It is the predictable output of government measures that distort competition behind the border. No analysis of why over capacity exists or why the trade deficit has widened can ignore the very real distortions in the global economy that suppress US exports and artificially increase US imports. Section 301 specifically reaches that conduct, through specific reference to unreasonable barriers to trade, as opposed to merely discriminatory ones, and the methodology I will describe shows how to measure it and how to respond proportionately.

II. The Framework — Anti-Competitive Market Distortions

The conduct at issue is what we call Anti-Competitive Market Distortions, or ACMDs. These are government-created or government-enabled measures that raise rivals’ costs, restrict entry, and reallocate rents toward favored firms.

ACMDs operate across three pillars: property rights, domestic competition, and international competition. When governments weaken any of these pillars, productivity falls, United States exports are suppressed, and imports enter the United States under distorted conditions.

The largest share of trade-related economic loss now comes from these behind-the-border distortions, not from tariffs. A formally open market in which institutional arrangements prevent United States firms from competing is, in substance, a closed market. Traditional trade remedies do not reach that problem. This framework can be applied to restrictions that impact US exports or to distortions in countries that more directly lead to increased imports into the US. The same section 301 test of reasonableness applied there also.

III. Tariff Methodology — Three Steps

The proposed tariffs are calibrated in three steps.

First, we measure the level of distortion in the foreign market — the country’s ACMD mass, expressed as the percentage of GDP per capita lost to distortions across the three pillars.

Second, we scale that distortion to the volume of imports the country sends into the United States. That gives us the burden on United States commerce.

Third, we convert that burden into an offsetting tariff rate. Countries exporting less than ten billion dollars to the United States are excluded. The offset is proportionate, bounded, and there is a pathway to zero when the distortions are removed.

We have included in the Annex a table showing the offsetting tariffs calculated based on country distortions.

IV. Korea

Let me turn to the three country cases. Korea first, because the distortions are concentrated, mutually reinforcing, and strategically damaging.

There are two instruments. The first is interventionist antitrust enforcement by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. The second is ex ante platform regulation under the Korean Online Platform Markets Act. They reinforce each other. Ex ante regulation freezes market structures before any consumer harm is shown. The KFTC then treats those distorted structures as evidence of dominance. Regulation and enforcement create a vicious circle.

The strategic dimension matters as much as the economic one. By burdening United States firms in a key allied market while permitting Chinese rivals to scale under state-linked advantages and softer treatment, the Korean system creates the conditions for Chinese firms to consolidate strength and then project it outward — back into the United States market through artificially cheap goods and digital services. The Korean system is, in effect, a ladder for Chinese competitors at the expense of American ones.

The combined economic loss is up to five hundred and twenty-five billion dollars over ten years. The suggested starting tariff is 20.31 percent from Korean general distortions, scalable to 30 percent to take into account this particular barrier and its US impact.

V. India

India operates through two reinforcing channels.

The first is competition-policy implementation. The Competition Commission of India is increasingly applying ecosystem-level market definitions and EU-style reasoning in digital markets. The result is rising regulatory exposure for large United States firms.

The second is foreign-investment restrictions — equity caps, approval routes, sourcing mandates, and beneficial-ownership screening, applied across retail, e-commerce, financial infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, telecom, aviation, defense, and space. Conditional access is not real access.

The harm is the loss of commercial participation in one of the world’s most important growth markets. The total implied GDP drag is one hundred and fifty-six billion dollars over five years. The suggested starting tariff is 28.36 percent.

VI. European Union and United Kingdom — Dynamic Alignment

The European Union case turns on the proposed UK-EU SPS dynamic alignment arrangement. Under that arrangement, the United Kingdom would remain bound to a moving EU rulebook covering sanitary and phytosanitary measures, food safety, pesticides, and related standards.

Dynamic alignment is not a one-time agreement. It is an ongoing obligation to keep pace with future EU rules. The United Kingdom would cease to be a distinct regulatory market and would become an extension of the EU system.

The EU SPS regime has repeatedly been challenged as unscientific and unnecessarily trade restrictive — most notably in the WTO beef hormones dispute. The affected products include United States beef, pork, poultry, crop-protection products, and gene-edited agriculture

The central estimate is twenty-seven billion dollars in foregone exports and thirty-three billion in foregone GDP. At the high end, fifty-eight billion in exports, seventy-two billion in GDP, and approximately three hundred and fifty-two thousand United States jobs. The suggested starting tariffs are 21.04 percent for the European Union and 17.13 percent for the United Kingdom, rising to match the EU tariff if dynamic alignment takes place.

VII. Closing — Common Logic

Three different fact patterns. One underlying problem. In each case, government measures distort competition, suppress United States exports, and burden United States commerce while preserving only the form of openness.

The proposed remedy is calibrated to the severity of the distortion and to the importance of the market. It is proportionate, bounded, and reform-oriented, with a pathway to zero when the underlying distortions are removed. This is not protectionism. It is a defense of competition on the merits.

Thank you. I look forward to the Committee’s questions.

 

Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural
Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors
Docket No. USTR-2026-0068

Submitted by: Shanker A. Singham
On behalf of: Competere LLC
Date: May 6, 2026