I. Opening
Chair, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today. My name is Shanker Singham, and I am testifying on behalf of Competere LLC.
The central argument is this. Structural excess capacity is not a naturally occurring market phenomenon. It is the predictable output of government measures that distort competition behind the border. No analysis of why over capacity exists or why the trade deficit has widened can ignore the very real distortions in the global economy that suppress US exports and artificially increase US imports. Section 301 specifically reaches that conduct, through specific reference to unreasonable barriers to trade, as opposed to merely discriminatory ones, and the methodology I will describe shows how to measure it and how to respond proportionately.
II. The Framework — Anti-Competitive Market Distortions
The conduct at issue is what we call Anti-Competitive Market Distortions, or ACMDs. These are government-created or government-enabled measures that raise rivals’ costs, restrict entry, and reallocate rents toward favored firms.
ACMDs operate across three pillars: property rights, domestic competition, and international competition. When governments weaken any of these pillars, productivity falls, United States exports are suppressed, and imports enter the United States under distorted conditions.
The largest share of trade-related economic loss now comes from these behind-the-border distortions, not from tariffs. A formally open market in which institutional arrangements prevent United States firms from competing is, in substance, a closed market. Traditional trade remedies do not reach that problem. This framework can be applied to restrictions that impact US exports or to distortions in countries that more directly lead to increased imports into the US. The same section 301 test of reasonableness applied there also.
III. Tariff Methodology — Three Steps
The proposed tariffs are calibrated in three steps.
First, we measure the level of distortion in the foreign market — the country’s ACMD mass, expressed as the percentage of GDP per capita lost to distortions across the three pillars.
Second, we scale that distortion to the volume of imports the country sends into the United States. That gives us the burden on United States commerce.
Third, we convert that burden into an offsetting tariff rate. Countries exporting less than ten billion dollars to the United States are excluded. The offset is proportionate, bounded, and there is a pathway to zero when the distortions are removed.
We have included in the Annex a table showing the offsetting tariffs calculated based on country distortions.
IV. Korea
Let me turn to the three country cases. Korea first, because the distortions are concentrated, mutually reinforcing, and strategically damaging.
There are two instruments. The first is interventionist antitrust enforcement by the Korea Fair Trade Commission. The second is ex ante platform regulation under the Korean Online Platform Markets Act. They reinforce each other. Ex ante regulation freezes market structures before any consumer harm is shown. The KFTC then treats those distorted structures as evidence of dominance. Regulation and enforcement create a vicious circle.
The strategic dimension matters as much as the economic one. By burdening United States firms in a key allied market while permitting Chinese rivals to scale under state-linked advantages and softer treatment, the Korean system creates the conditions for Chinese firms to consolidate strength and then project it outward — back into the United States market through artificially cheap goods and digital services. The Korean system is, in effect, a ladder for Chinese competitors at the expense of American ones.
The combined economic loss is up to five hundred and twenty-five billion dollars over ten years. The suggested starting tariff is 20.31 percent from Korean general distortions, scalable to 30 percent to take into account this particular barrier and its US impact.
V. India
India operates through two reinforcing channels.
The first is competition-policy implementation. The Competition Commission of India is increasingly applying ecosystem-level market definitions and EU-style reasoning in digital markets. The result is rising regulatory exposure for large United States firms.
The second is foreign-investment restrictions — equity caps, approval routes, sourcing mandates, and beneficial-ownership screening, applied across retail, e-commerce, financial infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, telecom, aviation, defense, and space. Conditional access is not real access.
The harm is the loss of commercial participation in one of the world’s most important growth markets. The total implied GDP drag is one hundred and fifty-six billion dollars over five years. The suggested starting tariff is 28.36 percent.
VI. European Union and United Kingdom — Dynamic Alignment
The European Union case turns on the proposed UK-EU SPS dynamic alignment arrangement. Under that arrangement, the United Kingdom would remain bound to a moving EU rulebook covering sanitary and phytosanitary measures, food safety, pesticides, and related standards.
Dynamic alignment is not a one-time agreement. It is an ongoing obligation to keep pace with future EU rules. The United Kingdom would cease to be a distinct regulatory market and would become an extension of the EU system.
The EU SPS regime has repeatedly been challenged as unscientific and unnecessarily trade restrictive — most notably in the WTO beef hormones dispute. The affected products include United States beef, pork, poultry, crop-protection products, and gene-edited agriculture
The central estimate is twenty-seven billion dollars in foregone exports and thirty-three billion in foregone GDP. At the high end, fifty-eight billion in exports, seventy-two billion in GDP, and approximately three hundred and fifty-two thousand United States jobs. The suggested starting tariffs are 21.04 percent for the European Union and 17.13 percent for the United Kingdom, rising to match the EU tariff if dynamic alignment takes place.
VII. Closing — Common Logic
Three different fact patterns. One underlying problem. In each case, government measures distort competition, suppress United States exports, and burden United States commerce while preserving only the form of openness.
The proposed remedy is calibrated to the severity of the distortion and to the importance of the market. It is proportionate, bounded, and reform-oriented, with a pathway to zero when the underlying distortions are removed. This is not protectionism. It is a defense of competition on the merits.
Thank you. I look forward to the Committee’s questions.
Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural
Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors
Docket No. USTR-2026-0068
Submitted by: Shanker A. Singham
On behalf of: Competere LLC
Date: May 6, 2026